Valparaiso University Law Review
Volume 10
Number 1 Fall 1975

pp.217-222

Fall 1975

William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The
Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760-1830

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of Legal Change on Massachusetts
Society, 1760-1830, 10 Val. U. L. Rev. 217 (1975).
Available at: https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/8

This Book Review is brought to you for free and open
access by the Valparaiso University Law School at
ValpoScholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Valparaiso University Law Review by an authorized
administrator of ValpoScholar. For more information,
please contact a ValpoScholar staff member at
scholar@valpo.edu.

et al.: William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact

AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW: THE IMPACT
OF LEGAL CHANGE ON MASSACHUSETTS SOCIETY, 1760-1830.
By William E. Nelson. Cambridge and London: Harvard University
Press. 1975. Pp. 269. $17.50.
The dignity, prosperity, and influence of the legal
profession is one of the most striking phenomena of
American culture. Surely in no other country have lawyers occupied a comparable position or played a comparable role.'
This comment by a leading contemporary historian would
have surprised the revolutionary generation of 1776. Lawyers
generally were regarded with distrust by Puritans who, with
many others, sought to abolish the Bar and give citizens direct
access to the courts in the new republic. Indeed, a hostility to
lawyers as self-aggrandizing parasites who will argue anything
for a price is deeply rooted in American lore.
Nelson's book is not in the first place about the rise of the
legal profession in America. Rather it is a study of the Americanization of the common law through an examination of all the
court records in one state, Massachusetts, from 1760 to 1830.
However, Nelson belongs to the new group of legal historians
who are not simply interested in the development of legal doctrine but would set those developments in their social and political context. The rise of the legal profession is very much involved
in the process by which law was taken out of the hands of the
people (juries) and put into the hands of a specially trained
legal elite.
This is the first effort to study American law during this
foundational period on the basis of court records themselves. It
undoubtedly lays the groundwork for future treatment of the indigenous American body of law.
Pre-revolutionary Massachusetts had a legal system vastly
different from the one we know today. Legislative activity was
minor and executive power was limited, especially in the field of
law enforcement, to what popular sentiment would permit. Real
power lay in the courts, which also performed many administrative functions; within the court system, juries dominated. Judges
could instruct juries on the law, but procedure required that each
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judge instruct jurors separately
that counsellors could argue the
the juries to determine both law
manifested the social consensus
quietly and secretly articulated.

(sometimes contradictorily), and
law as well. It was finally up to
and facts. Thus the legal system
on law and values which juries

How did the pre-revolutionary communities use this power?
Nelson argues that they used it to support primary religious and
moral values, reflecting an ethical unity rooted in the religious
establishment which promulgated moral standards for the community. Thus, in the fifteen years preceeding the War, the majority of criminal prosecutions were in the domain of moral and
religious conduct, ranging from fornication to Sabbath profanation. Similar values were present in civil law. For example, civil
defamation suits did not require proof of damages; lying itself
was grounds for imposing liability. Similarly, the law of creditors
and debtors was structured to discourage persons from going into
debt in order to speculate or to acquire unnecessary luxuries.
The law supported social harmony and ethical goals in many
ways. Laws guaranteeing minimum subsistence for all, minimizing redistribution of wealth, stressing prior possession in property and encouraging monopolistic control of scarce resources promoted social stability. Competition and economic striving were
discouraged by contract law which was based on ideas of fair
exchange and which involved formalities making executory contracts extremely difficult to arrange.
The War of Independence set in motion intellectual and social currents which transformed Massachusetts' legal and social
order. The new theory of sovereignty stressing the will of the
people resulted in the rise of political parties which represented
conflicting interests, shattering the old unity through public agitation over social policies and undermining social stability.
What new values emerged from this protracted conflict?
After a war fought for liberty, it is not surprising that "liberty"
became a primary value. "Liberty" meant several things. It required institutions through which the governed could determine
the substance of the law. The new powers granted to the legislature reflected this. Legal procedures safeguarding civil rights for
criminals also developed on these grounds. Finally, "liberty" had
egalitarian implications militating against slavery and for the
rights of women and members of dissenting religious sects.
Nelson describes the way in which these libertarian changes
accelerated the breakdown of the ideal that the community should
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/8

et al.: William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact

19761

BOOK REVIEW

219

stand united in the pursuit of shared ethical ends. What could
community members unite around? Violence and mob action, particularly in the aftermath of the War and during the rise of radical libertarian doctrines, led to an emphasis on order and stability
as it pertained to the protection of property. Accordingly, the
criminal law suddenly stopped prosecuting men for moral and religious offenses and concentrated on offenses against property,
thereby transforming the offender from a "sinner" into an antisocial culprit, a criminal.
While initially property rights were thus expanded and
strengthened, the expansion of liberty-always associated with
private property-gave way before the rise of public and private
interests which indeed rendered private property less safe than
ever before, as property became a commodity available for economic development. Monopolistic privileges, once a source of community stability, were replaced by judgments which favored development. Defaults were no longer viewed as breaches of trust
but as actions resulting from marketplace circumstances beyond
the control of the debtor for whom some relief would have to be
provided. Corporations, once designed as a means of serving community ends, became instruments for furthering its members' economic well-being. The law of contracts no longer furthered ethical interest in fair exchange but became an expression of rugged
individualism, reflecting the idea that a man could do whatever
he willed with his property so long as he did not injure another's.
Competition and materialism became the new dominant values as
the old ethical consensus broke down and the communities rallied
under the banner of progress and economic development.
In all this, Nelson discerns a shift from otherworldly, religious values to worldly, materialistic ones. While individuals were
free to choose their own values, the law was not neutral or valuefree. It came to view man not as a spiritual being but as an economic one and actively favored the new competitive and materialistic values.
Some of the legal changes were statutory, but the big surprise is the extent to which much of the law was judge-made.
The changes occurred so rapidly because of the explosion of the
nascent industrial revolution that not only were the judges the
first and most rapid reactors, but the very rapidity of change revealed to judges and lawyers alike that legal development was
indeed taking place, that law was being "made" rather than, as
had
traditionally
been
"found."
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Such development required important and permanent structural changes in the American legal system. Law finding was
taken out of the hands of juries and placed in the hands of judges;
new rules of evidence enabled the courts to supervise the factfinding process as well. And the government finally acquired a
sufficient monopoly on power to enforce the laws.
Nelson concludes by stating,
The changes in the power of the jury to make law,
in judges' understanding of their power to change law,
and in the ability of legal institutions to enforce law suggest that a final, fundamental change had occurred in
the nature and social function of law. Whether it was
made by courts or legislatures, law in nineteenth-century
America had ceased to be a mechanism for the preservation of local power and the building of local consensus or
to be a mirror of stable and widely shared ethical values.
In part it had become a mechanism for giving individuals
liberty to choose their own ethical values and for enforcing the choices they made. More often, however, the
function of the law was to resolve disputes among individuals seeking control over a particular economic resource. In resolving those distributional disputes, the law
came to be a tool by which those interest groups that had
emerged victorious in the competition for control of lawmaking institutions could seize most of society's wealth
for themselves and enforce their seizure upon the loser's.2
Nelson has titled this book, THE AMERICANIZATION OF THE
COMMON LAW, even though it deals only with Massachusetts, on
the hypothesis that what happened in that state happened elsewhere along the same lines. There is some research already supporting this thesis, but the major test will occur when historians
can study the comparable development in a state such as Pennsylvania, where conflict politics had already replaced consensus
politics before the Revolution, and where there was no religious
establishment comparable to that found in Massachusetts.
Nelson's heavily documented line of development makes good
sense. However, a cautionary word seems necessary at certain
points. The decline of prosecutions for moral offenses can only
partly be explained by the breakdown in unity and loss of spiritual goals. The churches had a rigorous internal system for hear2. W. E. NELSON, AMERICANIZATION
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ing confessions of, say, fornicators, and restoring them without
recourse to law. The growing Baptist movement refused to take
matters to court which they could decide within their own community. More important is the absence of ecclesiastical courts in
the American colonies. This left the whole matter of reporting
and enforcing moral or ecclesiastical offenses in the hands of government which was rarely interested in pursuing the matter. Thus,
the state's interest in pursuing moral prosecutions was dependent
on a variety of factors.' Indeed, just after the period covered by
Nelson, when presumably moral fervor had been largely replaced
by economic interests, the trial and conviction of Abner Kneeland
for blasphemy took place in Massachusetts.
Actually, moral concern remained foremost even during the
period of exploding commercial and economic activity because of
the universally held theory in America and England that moral
virtue and reform were basic to economic development." It was
believed that vices impaired productivity and led to poverty. Sexual promiscuity threatened a Malthusian deluge which would diminish the per capita slice of the economic pie. Probably the
flourishing state of the evangelical churches during the Second
Great Awakening which occurred during this period provided an
adequate form of regulating much personal moral behavior.
In discussing the slide into materialism which took place
after the Revolution at the expense of religious, otherworldly
values, Nelson neglects to note the extent to which the church had
been preaching against materialism in Massachusetts for a century while discovering the new bounties of the post-war period
to be a divine blessing which heralded the coming of the millenium. Development here, of course, included more than amassing
fortunes; it involved new forms of transportation, advances in
communication, applied technology, relief from drudgery and the
advance of health care. While this may well be another case of
the church's accommodating the status quo, in the eyes of many
contemporaries there was spiritual progress in the destruction of
monopoly, the creation of relief-giving bankruptcy acts, the rise
of individualism and nearly any act which promoted economic
development.
S. D. H. Flaherty, Law and the Enforcement of Morals in Early America,
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Is it possible, then, that the churches and the lawyers were
(and are) both implicated in creating that peculiar blend of nationalism, Protestantism and capitalism which characterized nineteenth century American society and is still a powerful current
today? And does the legal profession function today as the servant
of those interests whose principal goal is to forestall any redistribution of wealth?
Those are the kinds of questions that the new legal historians
like Nelson are raising and that make legal history today interesting and relevant to contemporary developments. Traditional
conservative legal history under the influence of Roscoe Pound
thought of the law as scientific, as having its own internal development, and as distinct from politics and historical contingencies.
The new historians place law in its social context, suggesting that
to do so will help lawyers avoid that professional tunnel vision
which separates their craft from its larger consequences and contributes to the divided psyches which debilitate many sensitive
practitioners in all the professions today.
RICHARD BAEPLER*
*

Dean of Christ College and Professor of Theology, Valparaiso Uni-

versity.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol10/iss1/8

